In April, a hundred years ago, Britain signed the Entente Cordiale with France. Some observers at the time expressed reservations about what would now be denounced as the far-right “Little England” press, but such protests were drowned out by a wave of enthusiasm for such a surprising diplomatic revolution. The agreement was hailed as a triumph of reason, progress and diplomatic agility. Britain had finally ended its age-old enmity with France, abandoned imperial adventurism, and emerged from its self-imposed chauvinist isolationism. Rather, it should adopt a more community-based diplomatic spirit with our neighbours on the other side of the Channel. In reality, however, the Entente proved disastrous both for Britain and for peace in Europe. The Entente was largely the inspiration of a Francophile social and political elite and was based on a mistaken appreciation of contemporary strategic position. The most important feature of the agreement was that it recognised that the UK had full control over Egypt and also over France in Morocco (provided that France`s final decisions for Morocco included appropriate consideration of Spain`s interests there). At the same time, Britain ceded the Los Islands (off the coast of France-Guinea) to France, defined Nigeria`s border in favor of France, and accepted French control of the upper gambia valley, while France relinquished its exclusive right to fish off Newfoundland.

In addition, the French and the British zones of influence in Siam (Thailand), which were eventually decided not to be colonized, were defined, with the eastern areas bordering French Indochina becoming a proposed French zone, and the western areas bordering the Burmese Tenasserim becoming a proposed British zone. Steps were also taken to dispel the rivalry between the British and French settlers of the New Hebrides. Can we discuss in the new agreement the seeds of new principles that could have practical value? The agreements on Newfoundland and West Africa correspond to a well-known type. These are territorial agreements which are extremely satisfactory for us and, no doubt, for France, but which do not express a principle that allows for widespread application. But the agreements on Egypt and Morocco are of a different kind. We are not entirely sure that Lord Lansdowne was well advised when he tried to obtain concessions in Egypt in exchange for concessions to France in Morocco. He exposed himself to the danger of giving something that could be very important to us in exchange for something that mattered very little. The right to use surpluses in Egypt for general purposes instead of dropping them into the reserve fund of the Caisse do in Dette, as they must do now, may or may not be a good thing for Egypt. Mr. Wilfred Blunt pointed out in our columns other reasons to believe that the strict control of Egyptian finances by the fund was a good thing for the country and that any relaxation could be to its detriment. But whether or not the greater financial freedom in Egypt is a good thing for this country, it does not bring profit to England, and there was a great danger, as Lord Lansdowne did, of using Morocco, where great British interests were at stake, to obtain financial concessions in Egypt that have no practical value for us. if it worked honestly.

But Lord Lansdowne, if you trust the summary of “Time” for many, not only avoided the obvious trap in Morocco, but also introduced a principle that could be of immense benefit to English politics in the future. In fact, he defeated some obscure political interests of us in Morocco in exchange for a guarantee of free trade for the next thirty years. We might have wished it had been an eternal guarantee; and if Lord Lansdowne could have obtained an eternal guarantee by renouncing his demands for more financial freedom in Egypt, we think that it is a thousand compassions that Egypt was ever introduced into the agreement. But despite these objections, the guarantee of free trade in Morocco – however limited in time – must be welcomed as the first of a principle of universal validity in our foreign policy. The deal was a change for both countries. .